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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2639 
___________ 
 
LUIS BUILES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN MOSHANNON VALLEY CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-17-cv-00023) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for a Decision on the Issuance of a Certificate  
of Appealability and for Possible Summary Action 
 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 2, 2017 
 
Before:   AMBRO, RESTREPO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 7, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Luis Builes appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.  We will grant the Appellee’s motion for summary action and summarily affirm 
the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Builes is a citizen of Colombia who was convicted in the District of Massachusetts 
of drug offenses and illegal reentry.  He is currently confined at the Moshannon Valley 
Correctional Center in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, and asserts that he will be removed to 
Colombia when his sentence expires.  In February 2017, Builes filed a § 2241 petition, 
alleging that his Equal Protection rights have been violated because his status as an alien 
prevents him from participating in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) programs that are available 
to inmates who are United States citizens.  For instance, he claimed that he is not eligible 
for a residential drug program, a camp program, half-way house placement, or a “near 
home release move that would allow him to spend quality time with his wife and kid … 
before reentering society.”  He also asserted that he is unable to work in the UNICOR 
program.1   
 A Magistrate Judge recommended summarily dismissing the petition, stating that, 
“[a]s a matter of law, [Builes] cannot show differential treatment based on alienage nor 
can he show that the BOP’s policy of distinguishing between prisoners with immigration 
                                              
1 Builes also complained that his immigration status prevented him from completing his 
college degree.  But his allegation was not directed to the BOP.  Instead, he asserted that 
“[h]e was denied enrollment by the colleges because [of the] immigration detainer.”  
Therefore, this claim is not cognizable in a § 2241 petition.   
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detainers and those without immigration detainers is irrationally related to the legitimate 
interests of preventing those prisoners from fleeing community-based confinement.”  
Over Builes’ objections, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation, 
dismissed the § 2241 petition, and denied issuance of a certificate of appealability.2  
Builes appealed.  The Appellee has filed a motion for summary action. 
 We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our 
review of the District Court’s dismissal of Builes’ § 2241 petition is plenary.  See Cradle 
v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).  Summary affirmance is proper 
when “it clearly appears that no substantial question is presented or that subsequent 
precedent or a change in circumstances warrants such action.”  3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 The Fifth Amendment lacks an Equal Protection Clause, but it contains “an equal 
protection guarantee” through its Due Process Clause and prohibits the United States 
from wrongfully discriminating between individuals or groups.  See Abdul-Akbar v. 
McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).  “Aliens, even aliens whose 
presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed 
due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 210 (1982).  To state an equal protection claim, “a plaintiff must at a minimum 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
2 Because we conclude that Builes’ challenges to the execution of his sentence were 
properly raised in a § 2241 petition, see Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 
241-42 (3d Cir. 2005), a certificate of appealability is not required for this appeal.  See 
Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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allege that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated by the 
defendant and that there was no rational basis for such treatment.”  Phillips v. County of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 
(1993) (“Of course, the INS regulation must still meet the (unexacting) standard of 
rationally advancing some legitimate governmental purpose….”).   
 The BOP has discretion to place prisoners in a residential substance abuse 
treatment program and in various types of pre-release custody (e.g., a community 
correctional facility or home confinement).  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(e); 3624(c).  
Successful participation in a residential substance abuse treatment program may result in 
a reduction in sentence.  § 3621(e)(2)(B).  But Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) detainees are not eligible for early release or pre-release custody alternatives.  28 
C.F.R. § 550.55(b); BOP Program Statement 7310.04(10)(j).  Similarly, ICE detainees 
generally are not eligible for assignments in the Federal Prison Industries program 
(known as UNICOR).3  28 C.F.R. § 345.35(a). 
 We agree that Builes has failed to show that these policies result in aliens as a 
group being treated differently from others based on their membership in a class of alien 
                                              
3 ICE detainees are not the only category of inmates ineligible for early release, 
community-based custody, or UNICOR participation.  See § 550.55(b) (designating as 
ineligible for early release, inter alia, pretrial inmates, “[c]ontractual boarders,” inmates 
who have committed certain offenses, and those who have previously received early 
release); Program Statement 7310.04(10) (deeming ineligible for community-based 
custody, inter alia, inmates who are assigned a “Sex Offender” Public Safety Factor,” 
inmates who require inpatient medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment, and 
inmates who pose a significant threat to the community); § 345.35(a) (providing that 
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prisoners.  “This is true because, on its face, the statute and regulations classify 
prisoners—not as aliens and non-aliens—but as those who have ICE detainers against 
them and those who do not.”  Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190, 195-96 
(5th Cir. 2012).  Furthermore, Builes did not identify evidence indicating that the detainer 
exclusions were motived by discriminatory intent against aliens.  See Arlington Heights 
v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265 (1977). 
 In any event, the District Court also properly concluded that the policies described 
above survive rational basis review.  Because the BOP’s policies implicate neither a 
fundamental right nor a suspect class, rational basis review applies.  See Gallegos-
Hernandez, 688 F.3d at 196 (holding that ICE detainee’s equal protection claim based on 
exclusion from rehabilitative and early-release programs did not involve a fundamental 
right); McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[b]ecause ‘prisoners 
with detainers’ does not constitute a suspect class, the detainer exclusion is valid so long 
as it survives the rational basis test, which accords a strong presumption of validity.”).  
Under the rational basis test, a government policy is valid if it is rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest.  Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988).  
Excluding ICE detainees from residential drug rehabilitation programs, community-based 
confinement, and UNICOR assignments is rationally related to legitimate BOP interests 
in reducing the flight risk posed by prisoners facing removal and in making rehabilitative 
programs available only to prisoners who have a lawful right to remain in the United 
                                                                                                                                                  
pretrial detainees are ineligible for UNICOR assignments).   
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States  See Gallegos-Hernandez, 688 F.3d at 196 (noting support for “the determination 
that ICE detainees are ineligible to participate in prerelease halfway house confinement is 
rationally related to preventing those detainees from fleeing during the community-based 
portion of those programs.”); McLean, 173 F.3d at 1186 (“[E]xcluding prisoners with 
detainers from participating in community-based treatment programs, and consequently 
from sentence reduction eligibility, is at least rationally related to the BOP’s legitimate 
interest in preventing prisoners from fleeing detainers while participating in community 
treatment programs.”).   
 For the foregoing reasons, there is no substantial question presented by this appeal.  
We will thus grant the Appellee’s motion to summarily affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
 
